In recent years, cyber a acks have caused substantial nancial losses and been able to stop fundamental public services. Among the serious a acks, Advanced Persistent reat (APT) has emerged as a big challenge to the cyber security hi ing selected companies and organisations. e main objectives of APT are data ex ltration and intelligence appropriation. As part of the APT life cycle, an a acker creates a Point of Entry (PoE) to the target network. is is usually achieved by installing malware on the targeted machine to leave a back-door open for future access. A common technique employed to breach into the network, which involves the use of social engineering, is the spear phishing email.
INTRODUCTION
Cyber a acks have become more widespread and several a acks have made headline news over the last 5 years, targeting industrial companies and governmental organisations [1, 2] . ese a acks have caused substantial nancial losses and been able to stop fundamental public services. e annual cost of cybercrime was $3 trillion in 2015, targeting both wired and wireless communications [3] [4] [5] [6] . Furthermore, it is expected to increase to more than $6 trillion per annum by 2021 [7] . e term cyber a ack generally refers to criminal activities lunched via the Internet, aiming usually at nancial gains or stealing con dential data. Additionally, the a ackers can spy and monitor the target organisation and disturb its functions, motivated by a political, ideological or criminal goal [8] [9] [10] [11] .
ese challenges have brought much interest in the research and investment towards developing new tools and approaches for cybersecurity. In recent years, Advanced Persistent reats (APTs) [12] have emerged, hi ing selected companies and organisations. e main objectives of APT are data ex ltration and intelligence appropriation. is a ack targets selected organisations and persists on the completion of the a ack until it is achieved. e economic damage due a successful APT can be very expensive. Furthermore, the a acker can compromise the target network for a long period of time without being detected. is type of a ack is currently one of the most serious threat to the cyber security [13] .
As part of the APT life cycle, an a acker creates a Point of Entry (PoE) to the target network.
is is usually achieved by installing malware on the targeted machine to leave a back-door open for future access. A common technique employed to breach into the network, which involves the use of social engineering, is the spear phishing email. ese emails, which may contain disguised exe les, continue to be a favoured means by APT a ackers to in ltrate target networks [14] . In a typical spear-phishing a ack, a specially cra ed email is sent to speci c individuals from a target organization.
e recipients are convinced through clever and relevant social engineering tactics to either download a malicious le a achment or to click a link to a malware or an exploited site, starting a compromise [15] . e malicious link may lead to a driveby download a ack, in which the user's computer can be infected with malware by only visiting a web site that contains the malicious content. en, the malicious code which is installed on the victim's machine can control the infected machine and perform malicious activities [16] . Typically, sensitive data is ex ltrated, passwords are stolen and keystrokes are recorded.
In [17] , we present a correlation-based system for APT detection, which runs through two main phases. First, eight detection modules are employed to detect the individual APT steps. ese modules are Tor connection detection [18] , malicious SSL certicate detection [19] , malicious le hash detection [20] , malicious domain name detection [21] , domain ux detection [22] , malicious IP address detection [23] , scan detection and disguised exe le detection. Second, a correlation methodology including clustering algorithms is utilised to correlate the steps related to one APT campaign. is paper presents the disguised exe le detection (DeFD) module, which aims at detecting disguised exe les transferred over the network connections. e detection is based on a comparison between the MIME type of the transferred le and the le name extension.
e rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the APT life cycle. Current approaches for APT detection are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents the proposed methodology for the disguised exe le detection. Experimental evaluation is provided in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes the paper.
THE APT LIFE CYCLE
APT refers to Advanced Persistent reat. APT is a cybercrime category directed at business and political targets. APTs require a high degree of stealth over a long period of operation in order to be successful. e a acker usually aims for more than immediate nancial gain, and infected systems continue to be compromised even a er the target's network has been breached and initial goals reached [12] . Figure 1 depicts the steps of the APT a ack [24] .
(1) Intelligence gathering: is initial step aims to get information regarding the target, like its organizational structure, IT environment and even about people who are working for that target. For this purpose, the a acker can use public sources (LinkedIn, Facebook, Twi er, etc) and prepare a customized a ack. rough this step the a acker tries to nd and organize accomplices, build or acquire tools, and research target/infrastructure/employees. (2) Initial compromise (Point of entry): Performed by use of social engineering and spear phishing, over email, using so ware vulnerabilities [25] . Another popular infection method is planting malware on a website which the victim employees will be likely to visit. (3) Command and control (C&C) communication: A er an organization's perimeter has been breached, continuous communication between the infected host and the C&C server should be preserved to instruct and guide the compromised machine [26, 27] . ese communications are usually protected by Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption, making it di cult to identify if the tra c directed to sites is malicious. Another technique can be used in this step is domain ux technique [28] ; an exploited host may try to connect to a large number of domain names which are expected to be C&C servers. e goal of this technique is to make it di cult or even impossible to shut down all of these domain names. (4) Lateral movement: Once ge ing access to the target's network, the a acker laterally moves throughout the target's network searching for new hosts to infect. e a acker can use brute force a ack to obtain information such as a user password or personal identi cation number (PIN); an automated so ware is used to generate a large number of consecutive guesses as to the value of the desired data. Another technique is pass the hash a ack [29] , in which the a acker steals a hashed user credential and, without cracking it, reuses it to trick an authentication system into creating a new authenticated session on the same network. (5) Asset/Data discovery: is step aims to identify and isolate the noteworthy assets within the target's network for future data ex ltration. Port scanning can be used for this step [30] . (6) Data ex ltration: Data of interest is transmi ed into external servers which are controlled by the a acker. ere are some techniques used for data ex ltration like built-in le transfer, via FTP or HTTP and via the Tor anonymity network [31] .
RELATED WORK
e APT detection is a challenge for current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), and much research has been conducted to address this type of multi-stage a ack [32] . e authors in [33] propose an approach based on C&C domains detection.
is approach processes the network tra c and depends on a conclusion that the connection to the C&C domain is independent, while the connection to the legitimate one is correlated. In [34] , the authors introduce an active-learning-based system for APT detection. is system detects the malicious PDFs les which might be included in a phishing email or a malicious website. e work in [35] describes a context-based system for targeted a acks detection. is system models APT as an a ack pyramid, where the a ack objective is on the top of the pyramid. en, the environments, where the APT steps take place, form the lateral planes. e authors in [36] presents an APT detection system called TerminAPTor.
is system tracks the information ow aiming to correlate meta alerts, generated for the individual APT steps, that may belong to one APT campaign.
ese meta alerts are fed to the system by an agent, which can be a standard IDS. e system explained in [37] is similar to TerminAPTor. However, the meta alerts are correlated based on a statistical methodology. e proposed framework describes APT as a multi-stage a ack running through ve stages which are delivery, exploit, installation, C&C and actions. Furthermore, it considers each stage to include several activities.
e authors in [38] explore Duqu, which is a piece of malware was used to launch an APT against a European company. e main objective of this APT campaign was data ex ltration. Additionally, this work presents a toolkit developed to detect the Duqu malware. is toolkit includes six investigation tools to analyse the tra c related to the Duqu malware. In [39] , a framework to detect phishing emails is proposed. ese phishing emails are utilised to initiate the point of entry for an APT. is framework performs a mathematical and computational analysis to cluster emails into malicious or benign ones. e developed algorithm makes use of "Tokens", which are pa erns of words and characters such as (DHL, noti cation, delivery, label, invoice and post).
A machine learning approach is introduced in [40] for APT detection. e algorithm utilises four features extracted from the users' tra c which are the open ports, memory usage, CPU usage and number of les in the system32 folder. A normal tra c is used to build the normal baseline of the system. en, a piece of malware, previously used in an APT campaign, is installed on a network machine and the malicious tra c is recorded. Di erent classi cation algorithms are trained on the collected tra c to build the detection model. e authors in [41] employ the Data Leakage Prevention (DLP) for APT detection. e proposed methodology is based on monitoring the data tra c and utilise the DLP to detect data leaks. Next, leaks pa erns are created based on the a ributes of the data leaks.
From the presented related work, we can see that APT forms a problem for the current IDSs in terms of real time detections. Furthermore, the steps of APT may occur over a day, week, month or even a year. is makes the alerts correlation a serious challenge. Additionally, missing the detection of one step or more of APT campaign makes it di cult to investigate the full APT scenario. A correlation-based system is proposed in [17] for APT detection, and this work is a step towards building the proposed framework.
DISGUISED EXECUTABLE FILE DETECTION (DEFD)
According to Mandiant APT1 report [42] , spear phishing is the most commonly used technique to get the PoE in APT. e spear phishing emails contain either a malicious a achment or a hyperlink to a malicious le. e subject line and the text in the email body are usually relevant to the recipient. Executable les supposed to end in .exe are made to appear as simple document les (pdf, doc, ppt, excel) to convince the victim to click on it. e DeFD module detects disguised exe les transferred over the connections. Meaning, it detects if the content of the le is exe while the extension is not exe. Figure 2 shows the methodology of DeFD; the network tra c is processed, all connections are analysed and all exe les identi ed when transferring over the connections are ltered. is ltering is based on the le content. Following this, the le name extension should be checked to decide about raising an alert on disguised exe le detection. Di erent security systems are used to monitor the network trafc [43] . Bro is used to implement the DeFD module. Bro is a network security monitor which can passively analyse the network tra c and generate informative events. ese events provide information about speci c network activities [44] .
Algorithm 1 shows the implementation pseudo-code of the DeFD module.
e network tra c is processed; this module waits for le over new connection event to be generated by Bro. is event indicates that a le has been seen in the process of being transferred over a connection. en describe() function is applied on that le; this function provides a text description regarding metadata of the le, so the le name can be extracted. is method is able to detect disguised exe les in both cases, uploaded and downloaded, but DeFD aims to detect only downloaded disguised exe les, as they are the ones used in the second step of APT. us, DeFD checks the current connection, in which a new le has seen being transferred, if it is established by a host from the monitored network. is is done by checking the connection source IP address through is local addr function; this function returns true if an address corresponds to one of the de ned local networks, false if not. For this reason, the subnet of the monitored network should be de ned.
Following this, the mime type [45] , which can be extracted from le over new connection event, is checked for its presence in t exe le if the le MIME type is in t exe le if le MIME type = fname extension then
if the same disguised exe alert has been raised during the previous 24 hours then 8: goto End 9:
Generate an event (disguised exe alert)
11:
Write disguised exe alert into disguised exe detection.log 12: Notify the network security team via email 13: Deny generating the same disguised exe alert during the next 24 hours 14: end if End les. erefore, if the transferred le is an exe le (based on its mime type), DeFD checks whether the extension in the le name is exe; this le name extension is extracted from the output of the describe() function previously mentioned. If the le name extension is not exe, this means it is a disguised exe le. Before an alert is raised, DeFD checks if an alert regarding the same host and for the same disguised exe le has been generated during the previous day. is check is to ensure that DeFD does not generate the same alert about the same set (host, le) during one day, therefore, DeFD checks if the current set exists in the t suppress disguised exe alert table, this table contains all detected sets during the last day.
If the current set (host, le) had not been detected during the previous 24 hours, DeFD generates disguised exe alert event to be used in the FCI correlation framework. e malicious connection information is wri en into a speci c log disguised exe detection.log, to keep a historical record of the monitored network. An alert email regarding disguised exe le detection is sent to RT (Request Tracker) [46] , where the network security team can perform additional forensics and respond to it. e current detected set (host, le) is added into the t suppress disguised exe alert table where it stays for one day to ensure that DeFD does not generate another alert about the same set during the same day. e wri en information into disguised exe detection.log is: timestamp = c$start_time , alert_type = disguised_exe_alert connection = c$id infected_host = c$id$orig_h malicious_file = fname
EVALUATION RESULTS
To evaluate the e ectiveness of the DeFD module, a download of disguised exe le was simulated via the campus network. An experimental server was set up, using Bro, to passively monitor the campus live tra c. DeFD was run on that experimental server for the purpose of disguised exe le detection. Two exe les were randomly selected, SkypeSetup.exe and ViberSetup.exe, and their names' extensions (exe) were changed into pdf and doc extensions, i.e. SkypeSetup.pdf and ViberSetup.doc respectively. e two disguised exe les were uploaded to the speedyshare.com public server. en a host working on a computer connected to the Internet through the monitored network was used to connect to that public server and download the modi ed les. As shown in Figure 3 , DeFD was able to detect both malicious downloads and write the information regarding each connection into a speci c log.
is experiment was repeated a hundred of times using di erent disguised exe les with di erent extensions. DeFD was able to detect all the malicious les, the average detection delay was 270 ms with a standard deviation of 54 ms. Figure 4 shows an example of a Disguised exe ticket, which was emailed to RT. 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
e appearance of new forms of cyber a acks, such as APT, has created new challenges to the current (IDSs). APT has emerged as a serious threat to the cyber security hi ing selected companies and organisations. is paper presents the disguised exe le detection (DeFD) module, which aims at detecting disguised exe les transferred over the network connections. e detection is based on a comparison between the MIME type of the transferred le and the le name extension.
As our future work, this module is to be used as part of a correlation-based IDS system for APT detection. e APT step detected by this module should be correlated with other steps, which are detected by other modules, to nd the full APT scenario.
